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Abstract 19 
 20 
Learning is fundamentally about action, enabling the successful navigation of a 21 
changing and uncertain environment. The experience of pain is central to this 22 
process, indicating the need for a change in action so as to mitigate potential threat 23 
to bodily integrity. This review considers the application of Bayesian models of 24 
learning in pain, which inherently accommodate uncertainty and action, which, we 25 
shall propose are essential in understanding learning in both acute and persistent 26 
cases of pain.   27 
 28 
 29 
Highlights 30 
 31 
• The experience of pain sits awkwardly in traditional stimulus-response paradigms 32 
• Accommodating uncertainty and action is imperative to learning models of pain 33 
• Bayesian models provide a normative, probabilistic account of learning in pain 34 
• Learning in pain is conceptualised as an ongoing prediction of the consequences of 35 
action  36 
 37 
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 2 
Introduction  55 
 56 
The process of learning is fundamentally about action. In order to successfully navigate our 57 
environment, we must continually learn about the ever-changing limits of our body and the 58 
constraints that it imposes upon our interaction with the world. The experience of pain is 59 
central to this process, indicating the point at which our bodily integrity is potentially 60 
compromised through action.  61 
 62 
The interaction between pain and learning can be better understood from an evolutionary 63 
perspective, by adopting the concept of the explore-exploit dilemma [1]. When our bodily 64 
integrity is threatened, we typically withdraw or rest (exploit) to allow sufficient recovery to 65 
within bodily limits, at which point we decide to interact (explore) within our niche. We learn 66 
over time when it is best to exploit and when to explore in order to promote adaptive 67 
behaviour [2,3]. 68 
 69 
Learning in pain, however, is not straightforward, owing to the complexity that comprises 70 
bodily integrity and worldly state. As a consequence, we find ourselves confronted with the 71 
reality that in some cases pain persists, seemingly decoupled from acute protection and 72 
adaptive behaviour. This necessarily goes beyond responding to and learning about a 73 
nociceptive signal, extending to an overall appraisal of the bodily and sociocultural 74 
environments in which we exist [4,5]. Adequately accounting for such a rich and diverse set 75 
of interactions is the challenge faced in establishing a learning model in pain.  76 
 77 
Current application of learning models in pain 78 
 79 
Over the last 40 years, associative learning models have come to dominate our conception 80 
of learning in pain [6]. These accounts are pervasive in different forms across the pain field, 81 
from Pavlovian (habitual) to Operant (instrumental) conditioning in behavioural psychology 82 
[7,8], extending to reinforcement learning and temporal difference models in computational 83 
neuroscience [9–12]. Operationalised through the Rescorla-Wagner model, the heart of 84 
associative learning models lies in the concept of an associative weight between stimulus 85 
and response, ranging from immediate, reflexive stimulus-response (model-free) to more 86 
complicated goal-directed actions, which alter proceeding stimuli (model-based) [13].  87 
 88 
Through the application of associative learning theory, it is posited that persistent pain 89 
reflects the generalisation of pain-related responses and maintained avoidance behaviour 90 
[8,17]. This conceptualisation has shaped our understanding of pain in the behavioural 91 
sciences, an influence seen from scientific investigation to clinical management. 92 
 93 
Yet, the experience of pain sits awkwardly in these traditional stimulus-response models 94 
[21,22]. In light of recent advances across neuroscience and behavioural domains, there is a 95 
growing consensus that perceptual experience is a predictive process, in which learners 96 
actively seek information to update their prediction of their internal and external environment 97 
[23,24]. This is problematic for traditional associative learning models in pain for several 98 
reasons. Firstly, pain is classically posited as a stimulus and conflated with nociception, 99 
which downplays the significance of pain as an experience and its explanatory role within 100 
theories of learning. Secondly, traditional associative learning models the state of the learner 101 
as a series of punctate values at any given time [26], which belies the learner’s uncertainty 102 
[25–28]. Finally, associative models do not adequately accommodate the active nature of 103 
the learner (i.e. being able to actively explore and intervene in their environment) [29]. It is 104 
proposed that these challenges for traditional learning models may be overcome by taking a 105 
Bayesian approach to learning in pain.  106 
 107 
The Bayesian Framework 108 
 109 
 3 
Bayesian approaches to cognition comprise many distinct models and theories, used in a 110 
variety of domains, and spanning distinct levels of explanation. Often, these distinct 111 
approaches are grouped under the label 'Bayesian Brain hypothesis' [30,31], despite their 112 
many differences. This review will focus on the underlying Bayesian model that informs 113 
these approaches, specifying the Bayesian derivative where appropriate.  114 
 115 
To date, the application of Bayesian models in pain has been limited to the description of 116 
perceptual experience, presenting pain as part of a probabilistic inference process that is 117 
shaped through the optimal integration of informative cues [27]. These models propose a 118 
mechanism for determining the hidden (latent) causes of encountered sensory information, 119 
summarised in a generative model [32]. In Bayesian terms, this is achieved through the 120 
weighted integration of prior experience and current (potentially multisensory) information, 121 
represented using probability distributions that reflect the agent’s subjective uncertainty—the 122 
optimal integration of these probability distributions is given by Bayes’ rule [33] (Fig. 1). 123 
 124 
 125 
 126 
 127 
Fig. 1. Generative models: Prediction of bodily threat (i-iv.). A generative model 128 
provides the framework from which predictions of the hidden causes of sensory 129 
consequences are generated (posterior), these are continually informed by multisensory 130 
sensory cues (likelihood) and previous encounters (prior). The relative precision, reflected in 131 
the probability density of these elements, influences the prediction. The more precise 132 
(narrow probability distribution), the greater the influence on the prediction. Threat panels 133 
(Left: i-ii) demonstrate the relative contribution of either a relatively precise prior (i) or precise 134 
likelihood (ii), the resultant prediction of threat is drawn toward the more precise source of 135 
information. In these cases, the sensory cue (likelihood) is the same in both panels, yet the 136 
relative precision of the prior determines the overall prediction of threat. Safety Panels 137 
(Right: iii-iv) demonstrate how the same relative precision can influence the prediction of 138 
negative threat, or safety. A precise prior, even in the presence of objective threat-based 139 
sensory cues, can influence the overall prediction to reflect safety (placebo effect) (iii). In 140 
contrast, an imprecise prior has less influence on the posterior (negative threat/safety) (iv). 141 
These hypothetical generative models demonstrate the possible decoupling of objective 142 
sensory information from experience, by accounting for the precision of the prior, which 143 
reflects the ongoing learning of the individual in keeping with previous experiences, 144 
homeostatic bounds and sociocultural constraints.  145 
 146 
 4 
Although not directly about learning, these accounts expose the fundamental elements of 147 
the Bayesian approach: a generative model, subjective uncertainty, and variable precision-148 
weighting. It is through the inherent encoding of the learner’s uncertainty that Bayesian 149 
models can shift away from specific associative weighting between variables towards a 150 
learning account that is both predictive and active. This is a significant theoretical 151 
development [26], which will form the basis of the proceeding review. 152 
 153 
Learning under uncertainty 154 
 155 
In Bayesian approaches, learners are assumed to have only indirect access to the state of 156 
their internal and external environment and must, therefore, infer their values on the basis of 157 
ambiguous and often incomplete information [34]. In contrast to associative learning models, 158 
Bayesian models encode uncertain beliefs about the world as probability distributions [35]. 159 
They assume that learners maintain multiple hypotheses (with differing degrees of belief) 160 
that reflect a range of candidate predictions about the state of the body and the world. This 161 
invokes the notion of a generative model (Fig.1), which can be used to generate the 162 
expected sensory consequences that may arise from hidden (latent) states of the 163 
environment, and in absence of external stimulation [36,37].  164 
 165 
According to Bayesian models, learning occurs through the adjustment of the prior 166 
distribution (e.g. estimated threat), according to Bayes rule, when new sensory cues are 167 
encountered. This asserts that over time a learner attempts to predict, with increasing 168 
finesse, the state of the world. Rather than veridical reflections, these predictions are an 169 
integration of probability distributions pertaining to the precision of the information.  170 
  171 
An emerging framework, derived from a Bayesian approach, known as predictive processing 172 
[23,38–40] casts the inferential process in probabilistic modelling as a matter of prediction-173 
error minimisation. According to this view, the learner’s generative model gives rise to 174 
multiple top-down predictions that are met by incoming sensory information (prediction 175 
error). This is a competitive process, where the prediction that best captures the incoming 176 
sensory information is selected, and perception arises as a result of successful prediction-177 
error minimisation1.  178 
 179 
The concept of prediction error here represents predictions and prediction-errors as 180 
probability distributions, thus retaining the inherent encoding of uncertainty of an agent’s 181 
beliefs that is common to Bayesian approaches. In predictive processing, specifically, this 182 
uncertainty is managed by precision-weighting mechanisms, which modulate the variance 183 
associated with the respective distributions, in order to contribute to the overall goal of 184 
minimising prediction error [41]. From this perspective, the learner’s principle motivation is to 185 
minimise the discrepancy between their prediction of the world and the sensory 186 
consequences of it (prediction error), in order to ensure they maintain an accurate model of 187 
their world (Fig.2). At a cortical level, it has been proposed that precision weighting of 188 
prediction errors is mediated by dopamine, with the potential to influence both accurate and 189 
aberrant learning [42–44]. 190 
 191 
As we shall explore, the learner can minimise prediction error in two ways: by updating the 192 
parameters of their generative model in order to better predict the future sensory 193 
consequences of action, or by holding the model fixed and altering their action within the 194 
world to sample information that better reflects their predictions. These mechanisms are 195 
described under the Active Inference framework [45].  196 
 197 
                                               
1 For a non-technical, conceptual introduction to the Predictive Processing framework see [23]. For for 
an overview of how the free-energy principle applies to the brain see [57].  
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 199 
Fig.2. Hierarchical Predictive Processing: from safety to threat. Proposed within a 200 
neural hierarchy, generative models are shaped over time to reflect the precision weighting 201 
of information. There is a continual bidirectional flow of information at each level of the 202 
neural hierarchy involving top-down predictions, prediction error, and the precision-weighting 203 
of prediction error. Schematically represented over time, an initial generative model 204 
encompassing bodily safety entails the prediction of low bodily threat as a consequence of 205 
action. Over time, in the presence of prediction error (a deviation from predicted bodily 206 
safety or predicted bodily threat), the generative model is updated to reflect an alteration in 207 
action consequences, that of threat. It is suggested that the ability to flexibly update this 208 
prediction of threat, in the presence of new sensory evidence (e.g. safety cues), is 209 
imperative to the resolution of the need to experience pain.  210 
 211 
Active Learning 212 
 213 
The inherent uncertainty encoded in the agent’s probability distributions not only satisfies 214 
learning paradigms that are typically challenging for associative theories (e.g backward 215 
blocking; see [26]), it crucially affords the agent an active role in reducing uncertainty. Active 216 
learning under this formulation is not simply the provision of an adequate sample space 217 
(spatial and temporal), it rests on the crucial ability of the learner to intervene in their world, 218 
sculpting the sensory consequences of their actions according to what is deemed most 219 
salient. The consequences of the learner’s actions can either support or disconfirm the 220 
predictions of the consequences of action, offering multiple means by which to reduce 221 
uncertainty [46,47]. These considerations of active learning recognise ecological validity 222 
from the perspective of being in, and acting upon, the world, and where actions are taken 223 
based on the ongoing (motivational) homeostatic drives of the biological agent. 224 
 225 
Active Inference2—a component of the predictive processing framework—extends these 226 
basic commitments and transforms the role of the learner in pain, from a passive processor 227 
of information, to a dynamic predictor of the relationship between the external and internal 228 
world. A key claim of the active inference model is that embodied action occurs as a result of 229 
                                               
2 For a review of active inference, which casts it as a process of descending projections (predictions) 
from motor cortex, see [43]. Other accounts have implicated the dopaminergic system as playing a 
key role in active decision-making, while also casting this within the framework of ecological 
psychology [44]. And, more recently, the active inference framework has been extended to 
incorporate homeostatic control [40, 51].  For a less technical overview, including empirical and 
theoretical support, see chapter 4 of [23]. 
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an agent predicting (inferring) the outcomes of certain policies (e.g. reaching for a cup), 230 
along with their associated precision estimations. The process of predicting future 231 
consequences of actions (i.e. associated sensory information) leads to overt behaviour 232 
through the activation of classical reflex arcs by downwards projections from motor cortex 233 
[46]. An illustrative example would be a policy that controls an agent’s task of reaching for a 234 
cup. Prior to enacting the reaching behaviour, the predictions associated with grasping the 235 
cup will be unfulfilled, and therefore result in error signals. However, instead of updating the 236 
generative model, the agent can instead take actions that lead to the fulfilment of error 237 
signals by actually reaching to grab the cup. In cases where the agent predicts that a certain 238 
policy will also likely lead to the experience of pain (e.g. bending down to pick up a heavy 239 
box), the agent may be reluctant to enact the respective behaviour, or choose to avoid it 240 
altogether.  241 
 242 
Seth [48] and others [51] have extended the active inference framework to account for 243 
autonomic regulation, arguing that similar predictions generated by the AIC are sent to the 244 
autonomic system via smooth muscles to activate autonomic reflexes in a similar manner as 245 
earlier described in the case of proprioception. By focussing on the embodied nature of the 246 
agent, active inference creates an intuitive segue that unites learning about the state of 247 
external world (exteroception) with the state of the internal world (interoception). The same 248 
predictive mechanisms that are responsible for predicting sensory states of the external 249 
environment are also responsible for regulating the internal environment [48–50] and for 250 
providing additional sources of information related to motivational drives [51]. Although often 251 
separated in traditional theories, perception and action are entwined in active inference, due 252 
to their dual-role in minimising uncertainty [15].  253 
 254 
The proposition that a single underlying mechanism (i.e. precision-weighted prediction-error 255 
minimisation) underlies learning about the condition of the body, has provided instrumental 256 
guidance for describing the generation of aberrant bodily predictions and the development of 257 
persistent pathological conditions [42,43,52–54]. It is suggested that persistent pain can be 258 
formulated in such a way [55]. To illustrate this, the experience of pain is mapped onto the 259 
‘warning light’ scenario, proposed by Adams et al, 2013: 260 
 261 
Consider a circumstance in which you are experiencing knee pain, you predict, with high 262 
precision, that the consequences of your action in the world will compromise the integrity 263 
of your body. Minor fluctuations in your interoceptive sensory cues (prediction errors) are 264 
assigned high precision, which serve to confirm the prediction of potential threat and 265 
propagate your experience of pain. You decide to visit your doctor who is unable to 266 
determine a specific cause for your pain, they even present you with your x-ray that 267 
shows “no structural cause for your pain”. Your first thought is that your doctor has 268 
missed something, that there must be something else going on, or that the x-ray has 269 
been misinterpreted. From your perspective all of these are plausible hypotheses that 270 
accommodate the evidence that is available to you. However, from the doctor’s 271 
perspective, without the knowledge that informs your prediction of bodily threat, your 272 
suspicions seem irrational.  273 
 274 
This adapted account highlights the consequences of precision weighting of information in 275 
the experience of pain. What is suggested is a decoupling between sensory input and 276 
subjective experience, where the latter is dependent on the relative precisions afforded to 277 
predictions and prediction error (Fig.2). The learner in pain updates the precision weighting 278 
of information that reflects their generative model in a changing world, informing whether to 279 
exploit or explore3. This places experiences of the body, whether well-defined through 280 
                                               
3 Some have proposed that precision-weighting may also be responsible for the transient switching 
between online and offline control [41]—allowing an agent to deliberate about some future policy, 
prior to taking action within the world. Although generative models play a central role in guiding online 
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disease process or medically unexplained, on a continuum [55]. What distinguishes them is 281 
the accuracy with which they account for the underlying physiological condition of the body.  282 
 283 
Persistent pain, from this view, occurs as aconsequence of precision: either via a precise 284 
prediction of bodily threat (top-down) or through aberrant precision weighting of sensory 285 
information (bottom up). In both cases, the prediction of bodily threat persists, and so with it 286 
the experience of pain, detached from veridical evidence of tissue damage and 287 
unchallenged by information assigned less precision. Altering the experience of pain this lies 288 
in the ability to promote the flexible reassignment of precision weighting, which in turn alters 289 
the individual’s prediction about their body and the world. 290 
 291 
The description of learning in pain thus becomes one that concerns optimal precision 292 
weighting over time. Importantly, under normative models, optimality does not pertain to 293 
accuracy. As such, aberrant but precise predictions of bodily threat (e.g high precision-294 
weighting of noisy sensory signals), and an accompanying experience of pain, may persist in 295 
the absence of an objective reality of threat. No more or less real, all experiences of the 296 
body are a reflection of our evolutionary history, sociocultural present and action-oriented 297 
future. 298 
 299 
Discussion 300 
  301 
One core pursuit of learning models in pain is to adequately accommodate the phenomena 302 
of acute and persistent cases. That is, why do the majority of people experience pain as 303 
transitory—an experience that efficiently promotes acute withdrawal, mitigating further 304 
harm—while a significant minority continue to experience pain in a way that seemingly 305 
contravenes optimal behaviour?   306 
  307 
We have broadly considered Bayesian models and their relevance to learning in pain. It is 308 
proposed that in order to accommodate the ecological validity of the learner in pain, the 309 
concepts of uncertainty and active learning must be addressed. As such, derivatives of the 310 
Bayesian model have been presented, which attempt to re-conceptualise the learner as an 311 
action-oriented predictor of their environment. 312 
 313 
An advantage of this approach is that learning in pain is considered under a unifying 314 
framework. The experience of pain becomes a problem of precision-weighting, inherently 315 
contextualised in relation to previous experience and future endeavour; both the resolution 316 
and persistence of pain lies within one’s ability to continually update the predictions of bodily 317 
state. 318 
 319 
The approaches that are described are not wholly opposed to the concepts present in 320 
associative learning accounts (e.g. kalman filter and the Rescorla Wagner model) [26]. 321 
However, a probabilistic formulation of learning promotes an account that naturally extends 322 
to the body and action [56], and is highly relevant to learning in pain, whereby the active 323 
sampling of one’s environment is fundamentally altered.  324 
 325 
                                               
behaviour (i.e. active inference), by decoupling generative models from the incoming stream of 
sensory information (prediction errors), through the use of selective modulation of incoming prediction 
errors (precision-weighting), generative models may also guide deliberative processes such as 
planning and offline reasoning [41,51]. This flexible switching between offline and online control could 
be viewed as a type of arbitration mechanism for model-free and model-based forms of behavioural 
control, albeit one that may be best viewed as more of a continuum of cases, rather than a well-
delineated set of options [41]. 
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Bayesian formulations have proffered much, not least a unifying theory of mind [57]. Yet, 326 
with such promise comes inevitable pitfalls [58–60], a number of which require consideration 327 
here.  328 
  329 
This review has focussed predominantly on the implementation of such models at an 330 
instrumental level, describing the macro phenomena in pain-based learning, without delving 331 
into the underlying neural architecture that such probabilistic models aim to account for [61]. 332 
Although increasing evidence supports the role of such realist applications in perception, 333 
[39,42,62], including in pain [63,64], these are yet to mature into adequate models of 334 
complex learning scenarios. Initial investigations comparing models of learning in pain, 335 
including generic Bayesian models [65], suggest that there is work to be done to outperform 336 
temporal difference models in computational neuroscience paradigms [66]. Consequently, 337 
some have argued that the Bayesian Brain should be treated as an instrumental theory in 338 
lieu of more developed mechanistic explanations [67]. An important question for the future 339 
application of probabilistic models relates to the nature of our experimental paradigms in 340 
pain. Using a model, designed to reflect an active learner who minimises uncertainty over 341 
time, may demand an alteration in traditional stimulus-response protocols. 342 
 343 
Associative learning theories would be considered incomplete without accounting for value, 344 
reward or utility in relation to optimal behaviour. Bayesian generalisations of the Resorla-345 
Wagner model, embodied in the Kalman filter, assumes that the target of learning is the 346 
problem of predicting immediate reward [68]. However, full active inference accounts aim to 347 
replace the notions of reward, value or utility, by subsuming them all within the generative 348 
model [13,69]. Whether these concepts can therefore be considered redundant, while still 349 
accounting for the complexities of learning in pain and pleasure, is yet to be determined.  350 
 351 
Conclusion 352 
 353 
We have presented a broad overview of Bayesian models of learning in pain. From this 354 
view, the experience of pain involves the continual prediction of the consequences of action 355 
in relation to bodily threat. As such, learning in pain is both predictive and active. Although 356 
there still exist many challenges to the full implementation of such probabilistic accounts, we 357 
propose that at present, Bayesian derivatives (such as predictive processing and active 358 
inference) can provide important considerations for researchers and clinicians alike.  359 
 360 
Acknowledgements 361 
 362 
The authors would like to extend there gratitude and thanks to Dr Max Jones for his 363 
insightful discussion in the critique and development of this review. 364 
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, 365 
commercial, or non-for-profit sectors. 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
 370 
 371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
 376 
 377 
 378 
 379 
 380 
 9 
 381 
 382 
 383 
References 384 
 385 
1.  Sutton RS, Barto AG: Reinforcement learning: An introduction. MIT Press; 1998. 386 
2.  McNamara JM, Houston AI, Collins EJ: Optimality models in behavioral biology. 387 
SIAM Rev 2001, 43:413–466. 388 
3.  Houston AI, Higginson AD, McNamara JM: Optimal foraging for multiple nutrients 389 
in an unpredictable environment. Ecol Lett 2011, 14:1101–1107. 390 
4.  Vlaeyen JWS, Linton SJ: Fear-avoidance model of chronic musculoskeletal pain: 391 
12 years on. Pain 2012, 153:1144–1147. 392 
5.  Karos K, Williams AC de C, Meulders A, Vlaeyan J: Pain as a threat to the social 393 
self: a motivational account. Pain 2018, In Press. 394 
6.  Fordyce WE: Behavioural science and chronic pain. Postgrad Med J 1984, 395 
60:865–868. 396 
7.  Meulders A, Vansteenwegen D, Vlaeyen JWS: The acquisition of fear of 397 
movement-related pain and associative learning: A novel pain-relevant human 398 
fear conditioning paradigm. Pain 2011, 152:2460–2469. 399 
8.  Vlaeyen JWS: Learning to predict and control harmful events: Chronic pain and 400 
conditioning. Pain 2015, 156:S86–S93. 401 
9.  O’Doherty JP, Seymour B, Koltzenburg M, Frackowiak RSJ, Wiech K, Friston KJ, 402 
Dolan RJ: Opponent appetitive-aversive neural processes underlie predictive 403 
learning of pain relief. Nat Neurosci 2005, 8:1234–40. 404 
10.  O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Friston K, Critchley H, Dolan RJ: Temporal difference 405 
models and reward-related learning in the human brain. Neuron 2003, 38:329–406 
337. 407 
11.  Seymour B, Daw ND, Roiser JP, Dayan P, Dolan R: Serotonin Selectively 408 
Modulates Reward Value in Human Decision-Making. J Neurosci 2012, 32:5833–409 
5842. 410 
12.  Seymour B, O’Doherty JP, Dayan P, Koltzenburg M, Jones AK, Dolan RJ, Friston KJ, 411 
Frackowiak RS: Temporal difference models describe higher-order learning in 412 
humans. Nature 2004, 429:664–667. 413 
13.  Friston KJ, Daunizeau J, Kiebel SJ: Reinforcement learning or active inference? 414 
PLoS One 2009, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006421. 415 
14.  Dayan P, Berridge KC: Model-based and model-free Pavlovian reward learning: 416 
Revaluation, revision, and revelation. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 2014, 14:473–417 
492. 418 
15.  Gershman SJ, Daw ND: Perception, action and utility - the tangled skein. Princ 419 
Brain Dyn Glob State Interact 2011,  420 
16.  Daw ND, Niv Y, Dayan P: Uncertainty-based competition between prefrontal and 421 
dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral control. Nat Neurosci 2005, 8:1704–422 
1711. 423 
17.  Crombez G, Eccleston C, Van Damme S, Vlaeyen JWS, Karoly P: Fear-avoidance 424 
model of chronic pain: the next generation. Clin J Pain 2012, 28:475–83. 425 
18.  Wiech K, Tracey I: Pain, decisions, and actions: a motivational perspective. Front 426 
Neurosci 2013, doi:10.3389/fnins.2013.00046. 427 
19.  Vlaeyen JWS, Crombez G, Linton SJ: The fear-avoidance model of pain. Pain 428 
2016, 157:1588–1589. 429 
20.  Gatzounis R, Schrooten MGS, Crombez G, Vlaeyen JWS: Operant Learning Theory 430 
in Pain and Chronic Pain Rehabilitation. Curr Pain Headache Rep 2012, 16:117–431 
126. 432 
21.  Melzack R, Wall P: The Challenge of pain. Viking Penguin; 1988. 433 
22.  Wall PD: On the relation of injury to pain. The John J. Bonica Lecture. Pain 1979, 434 
6:253–264. 435 
 10 
23.  Clark A: Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, action, and the embodied mind. Oxford 436 
University Press; 2017. 437 
24.  Hohwy J: The predictive mind. Oxford University Press; 2013. 438 
25.  Körding KP, Wolpert DM: Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning. Nature 439 
2004, 427:244–247. 440 
26.  Kruschke JK: Bayesian approaches to associative learning: From passive to 441 
active learning. Learn Behav 2008, 36:210–226. 442 
27.  Tabor A, Thacker MA, Moseley GL, Körding KP: Pain: A Statistical Account. PLoS 443 
Comput Biol 2017, 13. 444 
28.  Vilares I, Kording K: Bayesian models: the structure of the world, uncertainty, 445 
behaviour, and then brain. Ann N Y Acad Sci 2011, 1224:22–39. 446 
29.  Clark A: Embodied Prediction. In Open MIND. Edited by Metzinger T, Windt JM. 447 
MIND Group; 2015:7. 448 
30.  Doya K, Ishii S, Pouget A, Rao RPN: Bayesian Brain: Probabilistic Approaches to 449 
Neural Coding. 2007. 450 
31.  Friston K: The history of the future of the Bayesian brain. Neuroimage 2012, 451 
62:1230–1233. 452 
32.  Griffiths TL, Kemp C, Tenenbaum JB: Bayesian models of cognition. In Cambridge 453 
handbook of computational cognitive modeling. 2007:1–49. 454 
33.  Pouget A, Beck JM, Ma WJ, Latham PE: Probabilistic brains: Knowns and 455 
unknowns. Nat Neurosci 2013, 16:1170–1178. 456 
34.  Trommershauser J, Kording KP, Landy MS: Sensory Cue Integration. Oxford 457 
University Press; 2011. 458 
35.  Kording KP, Beierholm U, Ma WJ, Quartz S, Tenenbaum JB, Shams L: Causal 459 
inference in multisensory perception. PLoS One 2007, 2. 460 
36.  Koller D, Friedman N: Probabilistic graphical models: principles and techniques. MIT 461 
Press; 2009. 462 
37.  Chater N, Oaksford M: The probabilistic mind: Prospects for Bayesian cognitive 463 
science. Oxford University Press; 2008. 464 
38.  Clark A: Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of 465 
cognitive science. Behav Brain Sci 2013, 36:181–204. 466 
39.  Hohwy J: Priors in perception: Top-down modulation, Bayesian perceptual 467 
learning rate, and prediction error minimization. Conscious Cogn 2017, 47:75–85. 468 
40.  Seth AK: The Cybernetic Bayesian Brain. In Open MIND. . 2015. 469 
41.  Clark A: The many faces of precision (Replies to commentaries on “Whatever 470 
next? Neural prediction, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science.” 471 
Front Psychol 2013, 4. 472 
42.  Haarsma J, Fletcher P, Ziauddeen H, Spencer T, Diederen K: Precision weighting 473 
of cortical unsigned prediction errors is mediated by dopamine and benefits. 474 
bioRxiv 2018, doi:10.1101/288936. 475 
43.  Adams R a, Stephan KE, Brown HR, Frith CD, Friston KJ: The computational 476 
anatomy of psychosis. Front Psychiatry 2013, 4:47. 477 
44.  Friston KJ, Shiner T, FitzGerald T, Galea JM, Adams R, Brown H, Dolan RJ, Moran 478 
R, Stephan KE, Bestmann S: Dopamine, affordance and active inference. PLoS 479 
Comput Biol 2012, doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002327. 480 
45.  *Friston K, FitzGerald T, Rigoli F, Schwartenbeck P, O’Doherty J, Pezzulo G: Active 481 
inference and learning. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2016, 68:862–879. 482 
An active inference accoun of learning. The authors discuss model-based and model free 483 
learning in the context of belief. Here, the value function is absorbed into a single functional 484 
belief, centred around uncertainty.  485 
 486 
46.  Friston K, Mattout J, Kilner J: Action understanding and active inference. Biol 487 
Cybern 2011, doi:10.1007/s00422-011-0424-z. 488 
47.  Seth AK, Friston KJ: Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain. 489 
 11 
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 2016, 371. 490 
48.  Seth AK: Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self. Trends Cogn 491 
Sci 2013, 17:565–573. 492 
49.  *Owens AP, Allen M, Ondobaka S, Friston KJ: Interoceptive inference: From 493 
computational neuroscience to clinic. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2018, 90:174–183. 494 
The authors consider predictive processing and active inference as potential frameworks to 495 
describe the role of interoceptive inference in health and disease. Building upon the EPIC 496 
model put forward by Barrett and Simmons, 2015, they assert that pathology may arise as a 497 
consequence of deficits in the attenuation of ascending prediction error. 498 
 499 
50.  Pezzulo G: Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding 500 
model of perceptual inference. Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 2014, 14:902–11. 501 
51.  Pezzulo G, Rigoli F, Friston K: Active inference, homeostatic regulation and 502 
adaptive behavioural control. Prog Neurobiol 2015, 134:17–35. 503 
52.  Barrett LF, Simmons WK: Interoceptive predictions in the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci 504 
2015, doi:10.1038/nrn3950. 505 
53.  Edwards MJ, Adams RA, Brown H, Pareés I, Friston KJ: A Bayesian account of 506 
“hysteria.” Brain 2012, 135:3495–3512. 507 
54.  Brown RJ: Medically unexplained symptoms: a new model. Psychiatry 2006, 508 
doi:10.1383/psyt.2006.5.2.43. 509 
55.  Van den Bergh O, Witthöft M, Petersen S, Brown RJ: Symptoms and the body: 510 
Taking the inferential leap. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2017, 511 
doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.01.015. 512 
56.  *Clark: Busting out: predictive brains, embodied minds, and the puzzle of the 513 
evidentiary veil. Nous 2016, doi:doi: 10.1111/nous.12140. 514 
An accessible overview of the predictive brain literature, with a poignant attempt to extend 515 
the scope from a neurocentric mind to an extended mind. The brain from this account is just 516 
part of the embodied architecture that predicts the consequences of action. 517 
 518 
57.  Friston K: The free-energy principle: A unified brain theory? Nat Rev Neurosci 519 
2010, doi:10.1038/nrn2787. 520 
58.  Bowers JS, Davis CJ: Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience. 521 
Psychol Bull 2012, doi:10.1037/a0026450. 522 
59.  *Klein C: What do predictive coders want? Synthese 2016, doi:10.1007/s11229-523 
016-1250-6. 524 
A pessimistic overview of Predictive Coding/Procesing as unifying theories of mind, 525 
critiquing the ability of such accounts to accommodate motivation. The use of the dark room 526 
problem is central. Klein reconciles the application by providing insights into how such 527 
accounts can be enhanced through embodied frameworks.  528 
 529 
60.  Jones M, Love BC: Bayesian fundamentalism or enlightenment? on the 530 
explanatory status and theoretical contributions of bayesian models of 531 
cognition. Behav Brain Sci 2011, 34:169–188. 532 
61.  Rasmussen D, Eliasmith C: God, the devil, and the details: Fleshing out the 533 
predictive processing framework. Behav Brain Sci 2013, 36:223–224. 534 
62.  Gordon N, Koenig-Robert R, Tsuchiya N, Van Boxtel JJA, Hohwy J: Neural markers 535 
of predictive coding under perceptual uncertainty revealed with hierarchical 536 
frequency tagging. Elife 2017, 6. 537 
63.  Buchel C, Geuter S, Sprenger C, Eippert F: Placebo analgesia: a predictive coding 538 
perspective. Neuron 2014, 81:1223–1239. 539 
64.  Anchisi D, Zanon M: A Bayesian perspective on sensory and cognitive 540 
integration in pain perception and placebo analgesia. PLoS One 2015, 10:1–20. 541 
65.  Mathys C: A Bayesian foundation for individual learning under uncertainty. Front 542 
Hum Neurosci 2011, doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00039. 543 
 12 
66.  Zhang S, Mano H, Lee M, Yoshida W, Kawato M, Robbins T, Seymour B: The 544 
control of pain by active relief learning. Elife 2018, 7:e31949. 545 
67.  Colombo M, Series P: Bayes in the brain—on Bayesian modelling in 546 
neuroscience. Br J Philos Sci 2012, 63:697–723. 547 
68.  *Kruschke JK: Bayesian approaches to associative learning: From passive to 548 
active learning. Learn Behav 2008, doi:10.3758/LB.36.3.210. 549 
A core text expressing the differences and similarities of traditional associative learning 550 
models in relation to Bayesian approaches. A demonstration of how uncertainty and active 551 
learning are accommodated by a Bayesian model, accounted for backward blocking 552 
phenomena.  553 
 554 
69.  Friston KJ: What is optimal about motor control? Neuron 2011, 72:488–498. 555 
70.  Friston KJ, Daunizeau J, Kiebel SJ: Reinforcement learning or active inference? 556 
PLoS One 2009, 4. 557 
 558 
